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What is the evolutionary origin of the human ability to under-
stand and predict the behavior of others? Recent studies
suggest that human infants’ early capacity for understand-
ing others’ goal-directed actions relies on nonmentalistic
strategies [1–8]. However, there is no consensus about the
nature of the mechanisms underpinning these strategies
and their evolutionary history. Comparative studies can
shed light on these controversial issues. We carried out
three preferential looking-time experiments on macaques,
modeled on previous work on human infants [1–5], to test
whether macaques are sensitive to the functional efficacy
of familiar goal-related hand motor acts performed by an ex-
perimenter in a given context and to examine to which extent
this sensitivity also is present when observing non-goal-re-
lated or unusual goal-related motor acts. We demonstrate
that macaque monkeys, similar to human infants, do indeed
detect action efficacy by gazing longer at less efficient ac-
tions. However, they do so only when the observed behavior
is directed to a perceptible and familiar goal. Our results
show that the direct detection of the functional fitness of ac-
tion, in relation to goals that have become familiar through
previous experience, is the phylogenetic precursor of inten-
tional understanding.
Results and Discussion
The evolutionary origin of the human ability to understand and
predict the behavior of others has become a matter of contro-
versy since the apparent inability of nonhuman primates to un-
derstand others as intentional agents [9] was recently chal-
lenged. In fact, there is evidence that chimps, when engaged
in a competitive setting, are able to infer what others know
on the basis of where they are looking [10]. Even more impres-
sively, it has been shown that rhesus monkeys can establish
a cognitive link between seeing and knowing [11] and hearing
and knowing [12]. These results show that nonhuman primates
*Correspondence: vittorio.gallese@unipr.itpossess the ability to understand what others know about the
world on the basis of observable behavioral cues.
We decided to address the issue of the evolution of human
ability to understand the intentional behavior of others by
studying how macaque monkeys evaluate the efficacy of the
observed motor behavior of a human agent in terms of the ad-
equacy between means and ends in a given context. To that
purpose, we carried out three preferential looking-time exper-
iments modeled on Gergely et al.’s previous work with infants
[1] and substituted their computer-generated stimuli with real
actions performed in front of the monkeys by a human agent.
In experiment 1, macaque monkeys were tested to assess
their sensitivity to the adequacy between the means (the
type of reaching-to-grasp trajectory) and the goal (grasping
an object) of observed goal-directed motor acts according to
the contextual constraints (presence or absence of an obsta-
cle). In experiment 2, macaque monkeys were tested to evalu-
ate to which extent this sensitivity correlates with the goal
relatedness of the monkeys’ observed motor acts by showing
them non-goal-related movements. Finally, experiment 3 was
designed to assess whether the observation of any goal-di-
rected motor act, regardless of whether it is part of the mon-
keys’ behavioral repertoire, would trigger the sensitivity to its
means-end adequacy.
In contrast to previous studies [1–7, 13], we introduced
quantitative methods to assess the monkeys’ gaze by means
of an infrared eye-tracking device. We also measured the kine-
matics components of the actions observed by the monkeys
via a high-resolution video motion analysis (see the Supple-
mental Data).
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 included two testing sessions (Figure 1). In the
experimental session, monkeys (n = 6) were familiarized with
a human experimenter who moved her hand above an obstacle
to grasp an object (see Movie S1). In the following two test
events, the obstacle was removed. In one test event (motor
acts were congruent to the physical context), the experimenter
canonically reached and grasped the object by following
a novel, straight-line trajectory (see Movie S2). In the other
test event (motor acts were incongruent to the physical con-
text), the experimenter reached up and grasped the object
by following a curvilinear path identical to the one executed
during the familiarization trial to bypass the obstacle (see
Movie S3).
If during the familiarization trial monkeys interpreted the ob-
served motor act as the shortest path to the goal with respect
to the context, a motor act displaying the same curvilinear path
to the goal in a context free from any obstacle should have trig-
gered monkeys’ attention (expressed by a greater amount of
looking time) more often than when observing a motor act
that follows a shorter, straight-line path. Alternatively, if mon-
keys attended to the surface structure of the observed motor
act without relating it to the target object or the context, we
expected a reverse pattern of gaze behavior during test trials,
indicating sensitivity to novel actions.
In the control session, the same monkeys (n = 6) were
familiarized with a motor act identical to that used in the
Current Biology Vol 18 No 3
228Figure 1. Testing Conditions in Experiments 1, 2, and 3
The top two panels illustrate the familiarization condition followed by the congruent and incongruent test events in both experimental and control sessions in
experiment 1. The middle panel shows the familiarization condition followed by the congruent and incongruent test events presented in experiment 2. The
bottom panel illustrates the familiarization condition followed by the congruent and incongruent test events presented in experiment 3.experimental session (curvilinear trajectory, see Figure 1) but
executed in a situation where the location of a physical obsta-
cle didn’t block the direct access to the target object (see
Movie 4). The familiarization trial was then followed by the
same two test events presented during the experimental ses-
sion (see Movies S2 and S3). The rationale was to assess the
importance of contextual features during motor-act observa-
tion and prediction. First, an analysis of variance (ANOVA)
with repeated measures, with session (experimental or con-
trol) as the within-subjects variable, was conducted on the
normalized (Arcsine transformation) mean looking time for
the familiarization events (for further details on the statistical
analyses, see the Supplemental Data). Results revealed no
session effect on looking time (F(1,5) = 0.138, p = 0.726). Thus
subjects’ familiarization with the events was comparable
between both sessions.
Second, in order to assess looking-time differences be-
tween test events for both sessions and to control for the pre-
sentation order of test events, a 23 23 2 repeated-measures
ANOVA was carried out on the normalized mean looking
time, with session (experimental or control) and condition(congruent or incongruent) as within-subjects factors and
order (congruent first or incongruent first) as the between-sub-
jects factor. Results revealed no significant main effect or in-
teraction for order (all p values are >0.05). Thus this variable
was collapsed in the subsequent analyses. The interaction be-
tween the factors session 3 condition was significant, F(1,4) =
28.576, p = 0.006. A separate two-way ANOVA (session3 con-
dition) was therefore performed, followed by Tukey’s post-hoc
test. The results (Figure 2A) showed that in the experimental
session, monkeys looked significantly longer at the incongru-
ent events (mean = 43.26 6 SD = 10.12) than at the congruent
events (24.76 6 7.42), p = 0.001. A sign test confirmed that all
monkeys (100%) behaved the same way (p = 0.031). This dif-
ference, however, didn’t reach significance during the control
session, p = 0.692; sign test, n.s. (Figure 2B).
Because it is known that monkeys use gaze information as
an indicative behavioral cue (see [14] for a review), we com-
pared the amount of time monkeys spent looking at the exper-
imenter’s face (see the Supplemental Data) when congruent
and incongruent events were observed. Results from the
two-way ANOVA (session 3 condition) showed that only the
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(A and B) Shown are the normalized mean looking-time6 SEM directed to the motor events area of interest (AOI) in the experimental session (A) and in the
control session (B).
(C and D) Shown are the normalized mean looking-time 6 SEM directed to the face AOI in the experimental session (C) and in the control session (D).
*p < 0.05.main condition factor was significant, F(1,5) = 15.222, p = 0.011.
Results from Tukey’s post-hoc test demonstrated that mon-
keys looked longer at the experimenter’s face during incongru-
ent events than during congruent ones, p = 0.011. We further
explored the looking time with a sample-paired t-test for
both the experimental and control sessions. The results
showed that during the experimental session, monkeys
explored the experimenter’s face significantly more when
she performed incongruent actions (18.45 6 11.65) compared
to when she performed congruent actions (7.18 6 4.47),
t(5) = 3.496, p = 0.017 (Figure 2C). No significant differences
emerged during the control session, t(5) = 1.41576, p = 0.216
(Figure 2D).
Experiment 2
In experiment 2 (Figure 1), we investigated the influence of the
goal directedness of the experimenter’s movements on the
modulation of the monkeys’ looking time. To this purpose,
we familiarized the monkeys (n = 6) to the observation of
a non-goal-related curvilinear trajectory of the experimenter’s
arm in which she brought her hand above the obstacle and
stopped it in a fist posture above the target object without
touching it (see Movie S5). In the following two test events,
the obstacle was removed. In one test event (trajectory con-
gruent with the physical context), the experimenter moved
her hand toward the target object by following a novel
straight-line trajectory and stopped it in a fist posture without
touching it (see Movie S6). In the other test event (trajectory in-
congruent with the physical context), this movement was exe-
cuted by following a curvilinear path identical to the one per-
formed during the familiarization trial to bypass the obstacle
(see Movie S7). If the monkeys’ appreciation of means-endsadequacy depended on their sensitivity to the goal relatedness
of observed movements, the absence of a concrete goal
shouldn’t evoke any attentional enhancement during the ob-
servation of incongruent hand trajectories. A one-way ANOVA
showed no difference between the amount of looking-time dur-
ing the familiarization condition of both experiment 2 and ex-
periment 1 (experimental session) (F(1,10) = 1.182, p = 0.302).
Two separated repeated-measures ANOVAs showed no main
effect of condition on the amount of looking time during both
test events, F(1,5) = 3.514, p = 0.119 (Figure 3A) and on the
amount of looking time directed to the experimenter’s face dur-
ing test events observation, F(1,5) = 0.341, p = 0.585 (Figure 3B).
Experiment 3
In experiment 3 (Figure 1), we explored whether the evaluation
of the action’ s efficiency in a certain context is extended to
goal-related motor acts the monkeys most likely never ob-
served before and certainly never executed, such as lifting
an object with the thumb. To this purpose, monkeys (n = 5) ob-
served the actions of a human experimenter who had a piece
of Velcro wrapped around the tip of her thumb. They were first
familiarized to the observation of the experimenter moving her
hand above an obstacle to contact and lift the target object
(the same one used in experiment 1) with the thumb (see Movie
S8). In the following test events, the obstacle was removed. In
one test event, the experimenter contacted and lifted the ob-
ject by following a novel, straight-line trajectory (see Movie
S9), whereas in the other test event the experimenter executed
this action by following a curvilinear path identical to the one
monkeys had been familiarized with (see Movie S10).
If the observation of any goal-directed motor act automati-
cally triggered a particular sensitivity to its efficiency within
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Normalized mean looking time 6 SEM directed to the motor events AOI (A) and to the face AOI (B).a given context, then watching a human agent achieve her/his
goal through an inefficient trajectory should provoke a reliably
greater attentional enhancement than would watching her/him
following a path congruent to the context (see results of exper-
iment 1). On the other hand, if the appreciation of the means-
ends adequacy was restricted to the goal-directed motor
acts previously practiced by the monkey, the observation of
unfamiliar goal-related motor acts shouldn’t evoke any atten-
tional enhancement even when following incongruent trajecto-
ries. A one-way ANOVA showed no difference between the
amount of looking time during the familiarization condition of
experiments 3 and 1 (experimental session), (F(1,9) = 0.010,
p = 0.920). Two separated repeated-measures ANOVAs showed
no main effect of condition on the amount of looking time dur-
ing both test events, F(1,4) = 6.796, p = 0.596 (Figure 4A) and on
the amount of looking time directed to the experimenter’s
face during test-event observation, F(1,4) = 0.402, p = 0.560
(Figure 4B).
Finally, in order to compare the results of experiments 1 and
3, a crossexperiment mixed-design ANOVA with experiment
(experiment 1, experimental session; experiment 3) as a be-
tween-factor and condition (congruent or incongruent) as
a within-factor was conducted. Results yielded a significant in-
teraction between experiment and condition, F(1,9) = 11,565,
p = 0.008. Results from Tukey’s post-hoc test showed that in
experiment 1 (experimental session), monkeys looked signifi-
cantly longer at the incongruent events than at the congruent
ones (p = 0.0003), whereas no significant differences occurred
between those two conditions in experiment 3, p = 0.132.Conclusions
Results from experiment 1 show that macaque monkeys, sim-
ilar to 9- to 12-month-old human infants, detect the goal of an
observed motor act and, according to the physical character-
istics of the context (position of the obstacle), construe expec-
tancies about the most likely action the agent will execute in
a given context and therefore react differently to the same
goal (object grasping) when accomplished by different means
(type of hand trajectory). Monkeys’ sensitivity to means-ends
adequacy was further corroborated by their longer exploration
of the experimenter’s face in the experimental incongruent
condition. It could be hypothesized that when the experi-
menter started to execute motor acts that violated the
expected means-ends adequacy that monkeys tried to dis-
ambiguate the situation by searching for additional cues
such as exploring experimenter’s gaze direction and/or facial
expression.
How do the present data relate to the evidence of Gergely
et al. [1] on human infants given that our paradigm was mod-
eled on theirs? Csibra and Gergely [2] proposed that the devel-
opment in ontogeny of a full-blown, mentalistic intentional
stance [15] is preceded by a nonmentalistic teleological stance
based on a similar rationality principle applied to factual reality
and not on mental states. Teleological reasoning is described
as a ‘‘normative evaluation of actions based on the principle of
rational action, which allows for the assessment of the relative
efficiency of the action performed to achieve the goal within
the situational constraints given’’ [16]. According to the teleo-
logical hypothesis, revolving around an emerging theory ofFigure 4. Looking-Time Analysis in Experiment 3
Normalized mean looking time 6 SEM directed to the motor events AOI (A) and to the face AOI (B).
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231rational action, infants assume that agents pursue their goal in
the most efficient manner available given the constraints of
reality. Thus, 9- and 12-month-old infants refer to this interpre-
tational system to attribute goals to humans [4] as well as to
nonhuman [1–3] agents.
The results of our experiment 1, in spite of the different types
of stimuli employed, show an apparent similarity with those
obtained by Gergely et al. [1]. Experiment 2 demonstrates
that macaque monkeys’ evaluation of the action mean em-
ployed in a certain context strictly depends upon the achieve-
ment of a goal state (e.g., a motor act producing an observable
change in the state of reality). Just like 12-month-old human
babies observing actions directed to an absent target object
[4], our results show that when no interaction exists between
effector and target object with the resulting lack of causal
effect in reality, the evaluation of the observed motor act’s fit-
ness to the physical constraints of its context becomes impos-
sible.
The results of our first two experiments demonstrate that
macaque monkeys pay attention to the relation between the
observed motor acts and their observable outcome within
the constraints of a certain context (see also [17]). The results
from experiment 3, though, reveal that the specific sensitivity
to means-ends adequacy disappears when the goal-related
behavior and its end state are unfamiliar to the observing mon-
keys. However, given that the action in experiment 3 was both
visually unfamiliar and absent from monkeys’ action reper-
toire, our data do not enable us to firmly establish whether
the monkeys’ failure to see the observed action as goal di-
rected was due to either a lack of motor or perceptual familiar-
ity. Both hypotheses are, in principle, equally possible. The
issue of whether motor training or extensive perceptual expo-
sure would allow monkeys to extract the action’s goal remains
to be assessed through future experiments. Nevertheless, we
think that evidence both from monkeys and humans makes it
reasonable to propose the ‘‘lack of motor expertise’’ hypothe-
sis as a viable option. Let us see why.
Single neurons recording studies in macaque monkeys re-
vealed the existence of a class of motor neurons (mirror neu-
rons) that discharge during both the execution and the ob-
servation of goal-directed motor acts [18, 19]. It has been
proposed that the mirror neuron system (MNS), by matching
observed, implied, or heard goal-directed motor acts on their
motor representation in the observer’s motor system, allows
a direct form of action understanding through a mechanism
of embodied simulation [20].
Recent neurophysiological studies have reported that a par-
ticular class of ventral premotor mirror neurons starts to re-
spond to the observation of unfamiliar actions after extensive
visual exposure to them [21] or after motor training [22]. The re-
sults of both experiments seem to suggest that when an action
performed by others becomes familiar, independently from the
perceptual or motor source of its familiarization, it is neverthe-
less always mapped onto the motor representation of a similar
goal (to take possession of an object) belonging to the ob-
serving individual (on the impact of visual familiarity on motor
representations, see also [23, 24]).
A similar MNS involving homolog cortical areas has been
discovered in the human brain [18]. Even more strikingly, sev-
eral brain-imaging studies have shown that the intensity of the
MNS activation during action observation depends on the sim-
ilarity between the observed actions and the participants’
action repertoire [25–30]. In particular, one fMRI study [27] fo-
cused on the distinction between the relative contribution ofvisual and motor experience in processing an observed action.
The results revealed greater activation of the MNS when the
observed actions were frequently performed with respect to
those that were only perceptually familiar but never practiced.
Finally, it has been shown that motor familiarity, but not
perceptual familiarity, influences the capacity of 3-month-old
infants to extract goals from observed actions [5].
Our study does not provide direct evidence about the neural
mechanisms underpinning the present results. However, we
believe that a plausible explanation could be that macaques
evaluate the observed human acts by mapping them on their
own motor representation through the activation of the MNS.
Furthermore, we propose that the monkeys’ experience in pro-
gramming and executing goal-directed hand motor acts within
certain contextual constraints would result in an automatic ac-
tivation of the very same neural clusters when observing a mo-
tor act that reflects a similar adequacy to the context [19]. It is
possible that when the monkeys are familiarized with an ob-
served motor act consonant with their motor repertoire (like
passing over an obstacle to grasp an object), its resulting em-
bodied simulation automatically drives the perception of the
other experimenter as a ‘‘like-me’’ entity [31], thus enabling
the observer to predict the trajectories of future actions in dif-
ferent contexts (see congruent and incongruent test events).
This, however, appears to be true only to the extent that ob-
served motor acts are familiar to the observer, whereas famil-
iarization with inadequate motor acts (experiment 1, control
session), non-goal-related movements (experiment 2), or unfa-
miliar goal-related motor acts (experiment 3) does not allow
any simulation and prediction.
One final point worth discussing is related to the possible
different level of complexity of the actions displayed in exper-
iments 1 and 3 as a potential source of the difference in results
obtained in these experiments. Yet, if the displayed actions are
parsed as a sequence of goal-related motor acts, both of them
appear to be composed of two sequentially chained motor
acts (‘‘reach-to-grasp’’ in experiment 1 and ‘‘reach-to-lift’’ in
experiment 3), thus showing a similar level of complexity.
Let us finally turn to the relevance of our results to the ontog-
eny of action understanding. An increasing body of experi-
mental evidence shows that human infants develop early ac-
tion understanding abilities within the first year of life [32, 33]
and that the capacity to detect the goal of another’s action is
closely related to the infants’ prior motor experience [5–8]. Fur-
thermore, a recent study demonstrates that 3-day-old human
neonates [34], similar to other species of animals such as
chicks [35], show an inborn predisposition to attend to biolog-
ical motion. Such a mechanism has high evolutionary rele-
vance because it allows the act of recognizing the movement
of others in order to make an appropriate response [36]. Al-
though no strong evidence directly links human infants and
nonhuman primates’ ability to understand others as goal-ori-
ented agents to the natural tendency to attend to biological
motion, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that these two
abilities are grounded on a common implicit embodied mech-
anism. Such a mechanism might account for the phylogenetic
evolution of goal attribution [37, 38].
Taken together, our results suggest that nonhuman pri-
mates and human infants possess a similar ability to recognize
and evaluate the adequacy of goal-related behavior, which,
however, seems to operate at a broader level in infants. The
present evidence shows that perceptual and/or motor exper-
tise are important elements for the evolution of humans’ ca-
pacity of understanding the intentional behavior of others.
Current Biology Vol 18 No 3
232We propose that the direct detection of the functional fitness
of action, in relation to goals that have become familiar, is
the phylogenetic precursor of intentional understanding.
Supplemental Data
Experimental Procedures, three figures, and ten movies are available online
at http://www.current-biology.com/cgi/content/full/18/3/227/DC1/.
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